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dictum.50 Due to the logical and verbal difficulty of granting the wife
separation and alimony if the marriage relation still existed, the case
was interpreted by many as holding that the foreign divorce was good
for no purpose.51 But this difficulty is obviated by recognizing the
marital status as being composed of separate elements.
In 1943, Professor Holt made a prediction that seems to have come
true: "Yet the bones of Haddock v. Haddock remain-unbleached and
unpulverized ... courts in states that do not favor free and easy ter-
mination of marriage may still find in the osseous remains of Haddock
v. Haddock material to fashion some puzzles for the Supreme Court of
the United States to solve .... 52
JAY W. ALEXANDER.
Courts-Federal Jurisdiction-State Court to Be Followed in
Diversity Cases under the Erie Rule
Prior to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins' federal courts in diversity
of citizenship cases were bound to follow statutes of a state in deter-
mining the state law under the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson 2 The Erie
case, interpreting the Rules of Decision Act,3 held that federal courts
must also follow the case law of the state as announced by its highest
court. "The Erie R. Co. case left open, however, the more difficult
question of the effect to be given to decisions by the lower state courts
on points never passed on by the highest state court."' 4 The Supreme
Court of the United States has, since the Erie case, held that a federal
court is not free to disregard the law of the state merely because it has
not been announced by the highest court of the state, but that, in the
absence of more persuasive data of what the state law is, they must
follow the decision of an intermediate state court.5
" Cook, Is Haddock v. Haddock Overruled?, 18 IND. L. J. 165 (1942) ; Powell,
And Repent at Leisure, 58 HAxv. L. REv. 930 (1945).
"See e.g., BEALE, CONFLICTs OF LAWS §§113.10-113.12.
" Holt, The Bones of Haddock v. Haddock, 41 MicH. L. REv. 1013, 1036
(1943).
'304 U. S. 64 (1938).
* 16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842).
'Judiciary Act of (Sept. 24) 1789, §34, REv. STAT. §721, 28 U.S.C. §725 (1946).
'King v. Order of United C6mmercial Travelers of America, 68 Sup. Ct. 488,
491 (1948).
'Six Companies of Calif. v. Joint Hy. Dist., 311 U. S. 180 (1940); West v.
American T. & T. Co., 311 U. S. 223 (1940); Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
311 U. S. 464 (1940). Accordingly, federal courts have followed decisions of
intermediate courts in the following states:
California-Six Companies of Calif. v. Joint Hy. Dist., 311 U. S. 180 (1940).
Delaware-United Automatic Rifles Corp. v. Johnson, 41 F. Supp. 86 (D. Mass.
1941.
Illinois-Pullman Std. Can Mfg. Co. v. Local Union U.S.W., 152 F. 2d 493
(C.C.A. 7th 1945).
Missouri-Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U. S. 464 (1940).
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Should federal courts, in the absence of a decision by the highest
court or an intermediate court of the state, be required to follow a de-
cision of a state court of first instance? When this question was first
brought before the United States Supreme Court in Fidelity Union
Trust Co. v. Field,6 it was held that a federal court in applying the law
of New Jersey must follow the decision of the New Jersey Court of
Chancery. 7 The Court of Chancery, however, was not the usual nisi
prius court in that: it had statewide jurisdiction; its decisions were re-
corded and printed in available form and were ordinarily binding in
later cases in the Chancery; and its standing on the equity side was
comparable to that of the New Jersey intermediate appellate courts of
law. Since that decision, the question has been before a number of the
lower federal courts, the majority of which distinguished the Fidelity
case, and held that they were not bound to follow the state courts of
first instance. The distinction is based mainly on the fact that the
jurisdiction and organization of these state courts are quite different
from the New Jersey Court of Chancery.8
Recently this question was again before the Supreme Court in King
v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America.9 The case arose
in a South Carolina District Court,10 which, in the absence of any South
Carolina decision on the question, applied the general principals of
South Carolina law-" and found for the plaintiff. The defendant ap-
New York-Preferred Accm Ins. Co. v. Clark, 144 F. 2d 165 (C.C.A. 10th
1944).
Ohio-West v. American T. & T. Co., 311 U. S. 223 (1940).
Oregon-Mallatt v. Ostrander Ry. & Timber Co., 46 F. Supp. 250 (D. Oregon
1942).
Texas-Wells Fargo Bank & T. Co. v. Titus, 41 F. Supp. 171 (S.D. Texas
1941), rev'd on other grounds, 134 F. 2d' 223 (C.C.A. 5th 1943).
8311 U. S. 169 (1940).
The Court of Chancery, as a separate court, was abolished by the New Jersey
Constitution adopted November 4, 1947.
8 Wyatt v. Miami Beach, 67 F. Supp. 271 (S.D. Fla. 1946) (refused to follow
the Circuit Court of Dade County, Fla.; distinguished from the Fidelity case
mainly on the jurisdiction and organization of the two courts). In re Berlin, 147
F. 2d 491 (C.C.A. 3rd 1945) (refused to follow a Pennsylvania lower court, say-
ing it was persuasive but not binding). Contra: Buttson v. Arnold, 4 F.R.D. 492
(E.D. Pa. 1945). But cf. Miller v. National City Bank of New York, 69 F. Supp.
187 (S.D. N. Y. 1946), aff'd, 166 F. 2d 723 (C.C.A. 2d 1948) (followed a New
York court of first instance; however, the intermediate appellate court had af-
firmed the lower court without opinion). But see Kane v. Sesac Inc., 54 F. Supp.
853 (S.D. N.Y. 1943) ; Stinson v. Edgemoor Iron Works, 55 F. Supp. 861 (D. Del.
1944). Contra: Schran v. Safely Inv. Co., 39 F. Supp. 517 (E. D. Mich. 1941).
'68 Sup. Ct. 448 (1948).
'o 65 F. Supp. 740 (W.D. S.C. 1946) (Action on life insurance policy con-
taining exemption clause for death resulting from participation in aviation. Fed-
eral jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. Insured was forced down at
sea, later seen alive and not seriously injured, but was dead when picked up.
Medical diagnosis of drowning. Question involved was interpretation of exemp-
tion clause).
" Policy construed most strongly against insurer. In accordance with the hold-
ing in Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228 (1943) that, in the absence of
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pealed. Two months later, in a case involving a similar insurance
policy brought by King against a different insurer, the Court of Com-
mon Pleas for Spartanburg County, South Carolina,' 2 reached the same
conclusion'8 as the District Court in the first King case. However, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals on hearing the first King case,1 4 held
that the decision of the Court of Common Pleas was not binding on it
as an expression of the South Carolina law,15 and reversed the District
Court. It made the point that the Common Pleas decision was not
binding on other courts of the state and that the District Court decision
in this case had been partly relied on as a basis in the Common Pleas
decision. In affirming,1 6 the United States Supreme Court noted that
though the South Carolina Courts of Common Pleas are denominated
courts of record, their decisions are not published or digested in any
form and would be very difficult to locate. Further, their decisions
do not evidence one of the rules of decisions commonly accepted and
acted upon by the bar and other inferior courts of South Carolina. This
holding, though the first such limitation to be placed on the "Erie Doc-
trine," does not appear to be out of line with previous holdings of the
Supreme Court. It is a thoroughly logical conclusion, especially when
viewed in the light of Angel v. Bullington, decided only two years pre-
viously, where the Court said "For the purpose of diversity jurisdiction
a federal court is 'in effect, only another court of the state.' "7
The Court in the King case, however, emphasized that ". . . our
decision [is not] to be taken as promulgating a general rule that federal
courts need never abide by the determination of state law by state trial
courts."' 8 It would appear then, that although federal courts may not
some recognized public policy to the contrary which would warrant its non-exer-
cise, where the jurisdiction of the federal courts is properly invoked in diversity
cases, it is the duty of the federal court to render judgment, deciding questions of
state law. Merely because the questions are difficult or unsettled is no reason for
the federal courts to refuse to render judgment.
"A court of original jurisdiction in all civil cases. S. C. CONS?. Art. V, §1.
"' Under S. C. CoDE ANN. §§26, 780 (194:) the insurer had the right to ap-
peal, but did not do so.
"161 F. 2d 108 .(C.C.A. 4th 1946).
"Under the doctrine of Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U. S.
538 (1941) even though the Common Pleas decision was rendered after the dis-
trict court decision, it was proper for the circuit court of appeals to consider it,
since it is the duty of the federal courts to apply the then controlling decisions.
when the case comes before them.
"aKing v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 68 Sup. Ct. 488
(.1948). Shortly after the circuit court of appeals rendered its decision another
South Carolina Court of Common Pleas, the one for Greenville County, handed
down an opinion which rejected the reasoning of the Spartanburg court and
espoused that of the circuit court of appeals. The Supreme Court pointed to this
second decision and said that it was an illustration of the perils of interpreting a
Common Pleas decision as a definite expression of the South Carolina law and
not a controlling factor in their decision.
7326 U. S. 183, 187 (1945).
" 68 Sup. Ct. 488, 493 (1948).
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be bound by the decision of a state court of first instance under certain
circumstances, they cannot completely ignore it. In the absence of any
decision in a state on a point of law in a diversity case, the federal
court, in deciding the state law, would look to other states for law on
the point19 and consult the current textbooks,20 the restatements of the
law,21 the general statements of law by the state supreme court relating
to the subject,22 and the common law of the state.238 In addition, when
a decision by a state court of first instance is found, it would seem that
this also should be duly considered by the federal court, even though
it may have been determined that this decision is not binding on it. A
trial judge of a state court of first instance is experienced and well-
versed in the law of the state, hence a decision rendered by him would
be pertinent and should receive weight in the federal court's determina-
tion of the state law. Especially does this appear relevant when we
consider MacGregor v. State Mutual Life Assurance Co.,24 where the
Supreme Court said that the interpretation placed upon purely local
law by a federal district judge of long experience sitting in Michigan
and three circuit court of appeals judges whose circuit includes Michi-
gan would not be disturbed in the absence of a state decision on the
point.
Comparing the Fidelity case with the King case, several factors are
noted which may be useful in determining whether a decision of a state
court of first instance is binding on a federal court or mere evidence of
the state law which is to be used in the determination of the state law:
(1) are the decisions of the court in question considered as a binding
authority on other state courts; (2) are the decisions of the court in
question recorded, printed, or digested in such a manner that they are
accessible to the bar and other inferior courts; (3) has the court in
question statewide jurisdiction? Of these three the first would appear
to be the most important and unless the decision is binding on other
state courts it is doubtful that it would be binding on a federal court
even if the decision of the court were recorded and the court had state-
wide jurisdiction. However, if the decisions are not printed in such a
manner as to be available, even if the decisions were binding on other
courts of the state, it would be almost impossible to determine if all
the decisions of the courts of first instance on the question had been pre-
sented before the federal court. It would appear, therefore, that for a
decision of a state court of first instance to be binding on a federal
9 Stentor Electric Mfg. Co. v. Klaxon Co., 122 F. 2d 820 (C.C.A. 3rd 1941).20 Ibid.21 Ibid.
Verslius v. Town of Haskell, Okla., 154 F. 2d 935 (C.C.A. 10th 1946).23New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 118 F. 2d 414 (C.C.A. 4th
1941).
24315 U. S. 280, 281 (1941).
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court, the decision must be binding on other state courts and also must
be printed in available form.
With these factors as a guide a decision of the Superior Court of
North Carolina, for example, apparently would not be binding on a
federal court in the determination of the law of the state in the absence
of a decision on the point by the Supreme Court of North Carolina,
but mere evidence of the law of the state. The status of the Superior
Court of North Carolina is very similar to that of the Court of Common
Pleas of South Carolina. It is denominated a court of record, but its
decisions are recorded only in the local courthouse of the county and
are not reprinted or digested in any way which would make them ac-
cessible to the bar or other inferior courts. Further, a decision by one
Superior Court in North Carolina is not binding on another Superior
Court in this state. The court does not have statewide jurisdiction
within the meaning set forth in the United States Supreme Court opin-
ions in that, while it does have jurisdiction over all the citizens of North
Carolina, it has jurisdiction to try only such cases that are triable within
the county in which the court is located.
2 5
A. A. ZOLLICOFFER, JR.
Municipal Corporations-Tort Liability-Notice of Injury
Requirements
More than half of the states have statutes of general application
requiring that notice of tort claims against municipalities be given within
certain fixed time limits to designated city officials.' The requirement
is also frequently found in municipal charters, but no notice is necessary
in the absence of legal provision so requiring.
2
North Carolina has a statute3 requiring that a prior demand be made
upon the proper municipal authorities before suing a city, county, town,
or other municipal corporation, but it expressly applies only to debts
or demands arising out of contract where the damages are liquidated.
Another statute4 requires that claims against counties, cities, and towns
" N. C. GEN STAT. §§1-76 to, 1-82 (1943).
'Peterson, Governmental Responsibility for Torts in Minnesota, 26 MINN. L.
Rrv. 700, 701 (1942). For a list of states see Sahm, Tort Notice of Claim to
Municipalities, 46 DIcx. L. REv. 1 n. 2 (1941).
26 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §2888 (2d ed. 1937); WHITE, NEG-
LIGENCE OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §665 (1920).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. §153-64 (1943). judicial decisions restricted the operation
of this statute to contract actions long before it was expressly limited in this re-
gard. E.g., Sugg v. Greenville, 169 N. C. 606, 86 S. E. 695 (1915) ; Neal v.
Marion, 126 N. C. 412, 35 S. E. 812 (1900) ; Sheldon v. Asheville, 119 N. C. 606,
25 S. E. 781 (1896); Frisby v. Marshall, 119 N. C. 570, 26 S. E. 251 (1896);
Shields v. Durham, 118 N. C. 450, 24 S. E. 794 (1896) ; McINTOsH, NORTH CARO-
LrNA PRAcTIcE AND PROCEDURE §389 (1929).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-53 (1947 Supp.) : "All claims against counties, cities
and towns of this state shall be presented to the chairman of the board of county
19481
